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Commercial agriculture finance in Zimbabwe: past experiences and lessons for the future

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Abstract

The renewed commitment and interest by African leaders to modernize agriculture due to increased global demand for food; need to address sustainable development goals and a general decline in traditional funding sources for agriculture has reignited the long standing debate on the best approach to financing agriculture. Agricultural finance is viewed as a vital instrument for realizing economic and social integration of both small and large farm households. Using content analysis, this paper reviewed historical experiences in financing commercial agriculture, paying special attention to policy initiatives made since the colonial era up to present day. It highlights challenges and head way made in funding commercial agriculture. A review of success cases elsewhere has been made and related to the current challenges Zimbabwe is experiencing, leading to recommendations on what should be done to ensure that farm activities are fully financed with special consideration of hybrid financing schemes for commercial agriculture in Zimbabwe. What emerged from the literature and historical experiences of Zimbabwe is that unplanned and ad-hoc state interventionists' policies do not work, but rather a well-coordinated effort by all stakeholders particularly the private sector in harnessing savings towards agriculture is the master stroke to realising full potential of agriculture. The State role should be confined to regulatory and incentivising with limited direct funding to agriculture. Hybrid financing models proved to yield better results the world over in transforming commercial agriculture particularly to economies that embarked on land reform programs.

Keywords: *Agriculture finance, commercial agriculture, hybrid financing Schemes*

Introduction

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Agriculture plays a critical role in the national economy through employment creation, foreign currency generation as well as gross domestic product (GDP) contribution. A majority of Zimbabwe's population relies on it for livelihoods and source of income as 70% of her population lives in rural areas (ZimStats, 2016). Its role has been reinvigorated by the recent increase in global demand for agriculture food and it's by products and the subsequent drive by the global community to fight hunger in its various forms as well as creation of wealth (end poverty). Given that Zimbabwe is an agro based economy and has vast tracks of fertile land, it is prudent for authorities to expend much of their efforts to find ways of boosting agriculture output and since finance forms the life blood of farming efforts, it is critical to review past experiences in agricultural finance and draw lessons for future efforts. This paper seeks to review past initiatives to draw lessons for future policy interventions particularly in light of the need to address sustainable development goals.

Background and historical review of commercial agriculture finance in Zimbabwe

Commercial agriculture refers to the growing of crops and rearing of animals with the intention of wealth creation through selling of produce (Pantoja, Alvarez, & Sanchez, 2017). This can be done on a small, medium and/or large scale depending on land size owned by a given farmer. Colonialism brought large scale commercial agriculture to Africa including Zimbabwe, with promise of modernisation and jobs but habitually disposing citizens and exploiting labourers (Mutami, 2015). The origins of commercial farming or agriculture in Zimbabwe can be traced way back to the scramble for Africa period after the Berlin 1885 Colonial Conference which approved the taking over of African soil. The white settlers came to Africa in the late eighteenth century. Their interests were in mining and agriculture. A number settled in the then Southern

Rhodesia taking over fertile land from the black people. The settlers divided the land into large farms with title deeds to the settlers which made the land bankable (Woodend, 2003). The title deeds then facilitated the commercial farmers to access loans from financiers.

Historically, large scale commercial agriculture dominated farming and was the main beneficiary of most of the formal credit facilities in the agricultural sector (Scoones et al., 2012). The formal banking institutions and successive white regime traditionally supported large scale commercial agriculture which was predominantly white owned with little financial support going to few black commercial farmers (Woodend, 2003). The result was a highly skewed distribution pattern between the white settler community and the small holder farming community predominantly black indigenous farmers as the later could not access quality credit from formal financial institutions.

Table 1 Summary of Zimbabwe's agricultural development experience

Key areas	**First agricultural revolution (pre-independence)**	**Second agricultural revolution (post-independence to 1996)**	**The beginning of the third agricultural revolution (1996-2016)**
Agricultural exports	-Tobacco leading export based on state support	-Tobacco leading export	-Reduced production for most export commodities (tobacco, cotton)
Food security	-Limited information on blacks -Drought and emergency relief	-Increase in maize production in communal areas -10-15% of smallholders produces most of the marketed output	-In 2002/3 over 49% of the entire population in rural and urban areas required food aid -Maize production declined from 2.1 million tonnes in 2000 to 1.5 million tonnes in 2001 to 500,000 tonnes in 2002
Agricultural financing	-Increased credit availability to white farmers	-Increased credit to smallholders -Long term loans for large scale commercial farmers for infrastructural development	-Targeted funding (crop packs, irrigation, livestock, tobacco) by government -Private sector funding limited to cotton, barley, horticulture
Technologic	-Hybrid maize	-On farm research surveys in	-Merging of research and

al development	development -Cotton insects and disease control thus boosting production -Tobacco development	communal areas	extension (AREX) -Limited resources and inexperienced personnel
Extension and research	-Master farmer training introduced by Alvord -Training centres introduced (Gwebi, Mlezu, Domboshawa, etc.)	-Reduction of extension worker to farmer ratio (1:1000 in 1980, to 1:800 in 1990)	-Massive recruitment of extension officers with limited experience -Limited resources for research and extension
Agricultural marketing and pricing policies	-Agriculture declared a controlled industry and Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) coordinated parastatals -Massive subsidies to white agriculture -Tobacco auctions started	-Increase in marketing infrastructure in the communal areas -Liberalization of marketing due to ESAP -Abolition of AMA and semi-privatization/ commercialization of parastatals	-Control of maize and wheat marketing -Price controls and decontrols introduced across the board for all agricultural inputs and outputs -Revival of AMA
Land reform	-Increased land for European settlers -Creation of native purchase areas	-Market assisted land reform and slow progress in resettlement in the 1990s -3.6 million hectares acquired and 71,000 families resettled	-Large-scale commercial farming sector comprising of 4,500 commercial farmers has lost 90% of the land, whilst 135,000 blacks have obtained access to quality land

Source: Rukuni (2012); Sukume, Moyo, & Matondi, (2003)

Pre-independence experience

Pre- independence commercial agriculture was predominantly white commercial farmers producing a wide range of agricultural products chief among them tobacco (leading foreign currency earner), horticulture, sunflower, livestock among others (Rukuni, 2012). Tobacco was the leading cash crop and was nicknamed the Golden leaf as its contribution to export earning was almost at par with gold (Hlupo, 2018; Munongo & Shallone, 2010). Commercial famers used Commercial Famers Union (CFU) for networking and net weaving.

The structure of plantation of large scale settler farming of pre-independence Zimbabwe brought with it a multiplicity of benefits which include being enclave, large self-contained agri-business. They enjoyed economies of scale as they could hire skilled labour and engaged into vertical integration which may guarantee markets for produce and access to resources through support of suppliers.

According to Malaba (2014) Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) was the main funder of commercial agriculture with the support of foreign players mostly from European Union (EU) There were massive subsidies targeting mainly white minority farmers which significantly reduced production costs. AFC got credit lines from both EU and World Bank as the western world heavily supported the white minority farmers (Chibango, 2013; Masiyandima, Chigumira & Bara, 2011). Credit for commercial agriculture was readily available as most of international financiers were willing to partner with the settlers partly because of bankability of their land and their experience.

Post-independence experiences

The post-independence period of commercial farming in Zimbabwe as shown on table 1.1 above saw reforms that reflect the new order which was ushered in by the second *chimurenga*. Political independence of 1980 brought about remarkable rise in the participation of small scale farmers in the general economy (Hall, Tsikata, et al., 2017). Between 1980 and 1985, the portion of total maize sales coming from the subsistence farmer recorded a huge leap from 8 to 45%. During this period the new order was moving to correct the historical imbalances that were brought about by the coming of white settlers. Land reform was initiated late 1986 on a willing buyer willing seller basis as negotiated during the Lancaster house conference (Foti, Moyo, Chikuvire &

Mlambo, 2007). The land reform was progressing slowly as most of the white settlers were not prepared to part with their source of livelihoods. The government acquired 3.6 million hectares of land and resettled 71 000 predominantly black families and the size of most farms per household were less than ten hectares. These were mostly small scale commercial farmers and chose to mainly grow maize with a few selected cash crops. The smallholder farmers justification for farming and selling mostly maize after independence were increased producer price for maize by two fold and its upholding ahead of price increase of general goods over the time in question (Hlupo, 2018). The authorities also gave handouts of hybrid seed and fertilizer as a strategy to re-establish black small holder commercial farmers in the aftermath of the liberation war and the little rainfall of the early 1980s. During this period financial support for commercial agriculture was maintained though now capturing the once disadvantaged black small scale commercial farmers. Land was still privately held and blacks could buy land from white settlers and get title deeds, this made it easy for farmers to access loans from both local and foreign financiers as land was bankable (Chibango, 2013). Tobacco was leading in export earnings though other cash crops such as cotton began to gain ground on the international market (Dube & Mugwagwa, 2017; Rukuni, 2012). Agricultural finance was driven by AFC; however, given the increased need for support of small holder farmers and peasant farmers, the scope of AFC was expanded by making it a deposit taking institution through transforming AFC into a fully-fledged bank (Agricultural development bank of Zimbabwe- a commercial bank). This was done in order to increase the finance base to help support the newly resettled small holder farmers. Manatsa, Mukwada, Siziba and Chinyanganya (2010) noted that much attention by government was shifted to small holder farmers to fight poverty and enable such farmers to create wealth for themselves. Extension services for both commercial and communal farming significantly increased as the new administration intensified effort to expand agriculture as this was seen as the main stay of the economy (Woodend, 2003), though emphasis was placed on small holder farmers as a way to address historical imbalances. Concurring to the above Rukuni (2012) posited that after realising that the black majority who constituted the bulk of communal and small holder farmers were finding it difficult to access loans from commercial banks most of which whose ownership was predominantly white as they were perceived to be high risky clients, the ministry of agriculture had to assist the newly resettled farmers of the 1988 by expanding their skill base. The ratio of extension officers to farmers improved from 1: 1000 of 1980 to 1:800 by 1990, which subsequently led to increase in output (Manatsa et al., 2010). During this period agriculture productivity reached all time high levels as reflected by its contribution to output (21% to GDP in 1995), export (40%) and employment creation (contributed above 30% to national employment), this was accounted by both communal and commercial farming and was accompanied by increase in agriculture lending by more than 50%.

The land redistribution of the late 1980s was well planned and structured with the former colonial masters Britain paying for the process, though the pace of the transition was very low. The black majority became restive as a result (Masiyandima et al., 2011; Rukuni, 2012).

The period 1996-2017 as highlighted by Table 1.1 saw massive transformation in agriculture as the regime moves with speed to correct historical imbalances, this saw the commercial agriculture landscape significantly changing as exhibited by Taffesse (2010) and Woodend (2003). This is the period when the Land Commission of 1997 was done which led to the subsequent grabbing of land thereby resulting in change of ownership structure of land as the country revoked title deeds of the white settlers and the land was proclaimed to belong to state. This had serious far reaching repercussions on bankability of Zimbabwe land as commercial farmers lost ownership of land and lost security to bank credit (Parirenyatwa & Mago, 2014).

Large scale commercial farming sector comprising of 4500 white commercial farmers lost 90% of its land whilst black majority obtained access to high quality land as a result of land holding changing from private to state land without title deeds (Manatsa et al., 2010; Munongo & Shallone, 2010; Rukuni, 2012). This resulted in loss of collateral on farmers as newly resettled commercial farmers could not use their offer letters to access credit from financial institutions and multilateral institutions as these documents are not bankable (99 year lease- land belongs to state but being leased by commercial farmers), thus creating a new national problem on access to financial resources by farmers as they turned to government for sole supply of inputs financial resources thereby overstretching the treasury (Essien & Arene, 2014). The new farmers lacked expertise and finance among a host of problems and this reduced agriculture output, export value as well as threatened national food security. Table 1.2 show the trend as a result of the massive change in land structure.

Table 1.2: Production levels for cash crops (in "000" tonnes)

Crop/Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2005	2010	2015
Tobacco	177	178	171	226	197	68	59	123
Cotton	56	229	273	274	303	333	211	260

Sugar					541	429	259	334
Horticulture	34	41	46	54	63	57	35	43

Source: Abridged Zimstats Reports (2001 & 2016)

The economy turned from a bread basket to a basket case (Anseeuw & Ducastel, 2010; Malaba, 2014; Ministry of Finance, 2017) and agriculture finance experienced an all-time significant deep as yester year funders particularly the European union and the world bank deserted the new farmer reportedly due to their limited documented experience, and credit rating as well as non-bankability of their leases. In response the Government of Zimbabwe as noted by Masiyandima et al. (2011) came up with the Agriculture Sector Production Enhancement Facility (ASPEF) through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to address financing needs of the newly resettled farmer by providing loans through commercial banks, though the large chunk was disbursed through the land bank (Agribank). The credit was mainly to address short term needs at the farm. In a bid to capacitate the farm, the government through RBZ negotiated with Brazil through the agriculture mechanisation policy to provide on credit irrigation equipment to large scale commercial farms, tractors, boom sprays all at concessionary interest rates. Due to nepotism and corruption most of the equipment ended up in wrong hands, some lying idle at political elite`s farms (Manatsa et al., 2010). The repayment for the equipment ranged between five and six years, however due to government involvement and allocation on party lines repayment rate was less than 10%, the government ended up assuming the debt which critics argue that the ruling elite as beneficiaries were supposed to repay on their own than to burden tax payers with such repayment (Masiyandima et al., 2011). This worsened the general perception by lenders, in particular commercial banks that the black commercial farmer is not credit worthy and lacks necessary skills to run farm enterprise. This coupled with undercapitalisation of most banks added on the woes of genuine commercial farmers, banks became cautious in their lending to agriculture and short term expensive credit dominated agriculture finance (Dube & Mugwagwa, 2017). Agriculture Value chain financing at the turn of 2010s turnout to be a force to reckon particularly on cash crops such as soya beans, tobacco, and sugar beans as mutual beneficial contract arrangements such as contract farming and joint schemes complimented government in financing agriculture. However, most farmers complained of exploitative rates and limited scope of such value chain financing schemes (Hall, Scoones & Tsikata, 2017). In 2016 government once again continued with its interventionist policies in agriculture, this time in the mould of operation "*Maguta*" initially promulgated and introduced in 2007/8 targeting primarily maize production. This was directed at both commercial and smallholder farmers, the result was an increased maize hectarage and output, In the following years the programme was expanded to cover other crops and later livestock farming. The model was shelved in 2018 due to funding challenges as the government adopted the "austerity for prosperity measures", thus leaving the funding gap unaddressed. The government has however done little to capacitate state institutions such as the land bank through allowing private ownership, little has been done on keeping or coming up with a database of farmers with corresponding loans taken as well as their payment patterns and the subsequent rating of farmers (Hlupo, 2018).

Methodology

The paper adopted a systematic review of literature by sifting through scholarly articles on the subject (agriculture financing). The review model was driven by the rapidly increasing number of scientific publications in the last decades

(Rapple, 2011). It used the synthesis method. Journal articles from science direct, Elsevier, Taylor and Francis group of journals as well as local and regional articles on the subject from reputable journals were reviewed. The key terms which were used to search relevant journals were agriculture finance, rural financing, funding high risk business projects.

Results

Financing challenges experienced by agriculture stakeholders in Zimbabwe and beyond

Agricultural finance in Zimbabwe is faced by several challenges which have contributed to its failure. This include dependency on unsustainable financing sources, low lending rates (unable to attract investment), high loan delinquencies as well as high transaction costs (Masiyandima et al., 2011; Chigumira 2018). Since the turn of the new millennium government has turned to be the main financier as reflected by its direct interventionist policy through operation maguta, '*Zunde ramambo*", and command agriculture and indirect through Agribank and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and other commercial banks. Operation maguta dismally failed as most farmers did not repay back the loans, to them they viewed the advancing of input through the model as a political campaigning too which should not be repaid back (Masiyandima et al., 2011). The Agribank and RBZ model has been heavily criticised due to undercapitalisation and its overreliance on national treasury rather than being self-financing (Chigumira, 2018). This has been worsened by the new policy direction of "Austerity for posterity" with thrust on cutting expenditure which has already seen the withdrawal of state funding in Agriculture as the nation move towards market forces in addressing finance challenges in agriculture (Hlupo, 2018). Agribank remains wholly owned by the government since its inception, this has drained the central government as the credit repayment rate remains very low (below 20%). The borrowing rates in real terms are very low which has discouraged lending to agriculture. This has been worsened by low savings and high loan delinquency. Commercial banks have shunned agriculture financing due to high delinquency as well as lack of quality collateral as farming land is no longer bankable (Mwamakamba et al., 2017). A lot needs to be done to address these challenges, thus addressing the funding gap in agriculture. Recent developments on agriculture finance success stories elsewhere can help future policy initiatives` drive towards sustainable agriculture financing.

Successful cases of agriculture Finance: Lessons for Zimbabwe

Structuring of agriculture credit is critical to success of deployment of agricultural finance initiatives. Lessons can be drawn from experiences elsewhere. Success examples in agriculture finance, globally, have been modelled around innovative techniques and hybrid techniques such as the Grameen Bank's Group Based Model. (Pantoja *et al*, 2017). The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, Thailand's Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives and Bank Rakyat Indonesia are notable cases of efficacious agriculture credit institutions that give loans to farmers. Through group based credit programs, finance is advanced through peer groups, with members of such group co-guaranteeing pay back for each other's loans. Peer pressure and collective responsibilities are used as collateral substitutes by banks. A distinguished likeness among the successful agriculture credit institutions is that they all offer wholesome banking from savings mobilization to lending as opposed to just being conduits for channelling funds to the farm, thus they view agricultural finance from both supply side and demand side which provides an expanded view to agriculture lending. The financial institutions are also generally market dependent on both deposits and lending rates used and offer incentives and or bonuses to borrowers and staff for good loan performance.

Bangladesh Grameen bank

The finance system to support rural growth and agriculture should be structured in a way that address real issues in finance (Chisasa, 2014). They should be structured around innovative techniques through anticipation of customer's needs and address them at a profit. Grameen Bank in Bangladesh`s group based model provides such an example of highly innovative techniques in financing agriculture (Joshee, 2008). The Grameen bank was transformed into an independent institution by 1983 with the Bangladesh government controlling sixty (60) of the shareholding and the balance of forty (40%) being owned by borrowers (Maurer, 2004). The bank at its inception was a task oriented institution created for the purposes of improving the rural livelihoods particularly women through group lending. The sustainability of the Grameen bank model sources is reflected by the gradual decline in government ownership from initial 60% to 7% as authorities moved to capacitate the bank to address rural livelihoods, thus the bank has moved from dependency on treasury to own internal financing (Maurer, 2004). This allowed the government to concentrate on other development goals of the nation. Unlike most failed rural financial institutions which viewed agricultural funding only from one angle, the Grameen model integrates lending to savings such that resources wont dry up, efforts are made on both fronts- harnessing resources for agriculture and rural livelihoods through savings mobilisation while at the same time lend the raised resources through group lending schemes (Mbizi & Gwangwava, 2013). The clientele base of the bank grew to more than two million and annual loan disbursement of more than 29 million by 1994, boasting of more than US$800 million disbursement.

Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI)

In Indonesia the government introduced the rural credit program in 1984. The bank managed over the years to grow significantly its savings and deposit mobilisation base, thus reducing its dependency on government subsidies. The banks adopted a business model to increase its asset base. It adopted market based lending and deposit lending, thus operating commercially to ensure efficient intermediation between savers and borrowers (Persero, 2018). The bank in a bid to reach out to the most underprivileged member of the society use mobile banking techniques thanks to a good network system of Indonesia. This has significantly reduced operating costs and improved on ease of doing business on clients. Use of incentives and bonus linked to loan performance to borrowers and bank employees resulted in high repayment rates on loans, thus boosting business through BRI. The model like the Grameen model is grounded on market performance view which argues for integration of demand and supply issues in addressing agricultural finance (Kohler et al., 2018).

Standard Chartered Bank of South Africa (SCBSA) model

The success of SCBSA is traced from the innovation perspective on financing of agriculture. The bank adopted a highly innovative approach to providing credit to farmers without the use of collateral security. Most of farmers lack quality collateral security, thus the bank advances credit to farmers through agri-contractors. The contractor in the arrangement act as a middlemen and is closer to the farmer, thus the contractor knows the farmer better than the bank, knows the character of borrowers, thus eliminating adverse selection in loan granting. Funding is provided for all stages of production from land preparation to marketing up to when the products are delivered (Pantoja *et al*, 2017). This lending model removes the risk from the farmer to the contractor. It is the contractor and the bank that takes the responsibility of hedging the prices at contracting stages through engaging in derivative financial securities such as forwards and or options. Through such a model the bank has managed to finance production area of more than 40 000hectares in 2010 farming season for various crops. In addition to commercial scale financing the bank through group lending schemes is also financing smallholder farmers which has been credited for cost cutting (Bergius, Benjaminsen, & Widgren, 2018; Mwanamambo, Salin, & Mukumbuta, 2007). In addition, ABSA has also successfully extended loans to commercial farmers through value chain financing with contract farming as an example.

Crowd funding case in Nigeria

Nigeria in its bid to diversify from an oil dependent nation with agriculture, had to explore new ways of financing agriculture as most financial institutions were more inclined towards oil production as the risk in agriculture had been perceived to be high. Eighty percent of the farmers are small to medium holders with the remaining 20% being into commercial agriculture (Essien & Arene, 2014). New agro tech start-ups dominated commercial agriculture, thanks to diffusion of technology. Through farm start-ups like FarmCrowd and ThriveAgric, agriculture ventures accessed funding from middle class Nigeria to fund their operations. The entire process happened online, many middle income Nigerian citizens saw the potential in agriculture and use such platforms as FarmCrowd to invest in agriculture. FarmCrowd with its network of over 3 500 commercial farmers managed to provide the farmers with funds, equipment and technical support, it administered credit of more than USD$400 million per year. Besides financing, FarmCrowd assist farmers with quick sale of produce by securing orders from prospective buyers before each harvest cycle to ensure that supply matches demand, thus assuring return to its crowd funders (Kazeem, 2017). With a majority of its clients being smallholder lacking capacity to operate at scale, FarmCrowd`s business model allows farmers access to capital to hire more skilled labour and equipment to cultivate larger farmlands (Mullin, Morgan, Nagle, & Ross, 2006). Since its inception in November 2016 Farmcrowd, has managed to attract over 1000 farm sponsors with a 76% rate of repeat investment, thus signifying its huge potential to harnessing resources for agriculture (Kazeem, 2017). Since its launch the timeline for securing a sponsor for this model has been reduced to only a few minutes less than 20 minutes since it already has a large database of potential financiers, thus cutting processing time of formal banking institutions.

ThriveAgric on the other hand operates on an almost similar model with a minor twist. Rather than financing existing farmlands, the organisation leases farmlands from communities and then contracts farmers to plant crops based on demand, the farmers should be highly skilled and have a proven record on farming (Rau, 2017). Subsequent to that, ThriveAgric secures purchase orders for farm produce to ensure farm sales after harvest, since its formation the model has funded more than 300 hundred commercial farmers and contributed significantly to export earnings (Boum, 2015). Both schemes in order to protect investor`s funds, they insure farms during the harvest cycle against all forms of risks. In addition to provision of finance the two crowd farming initiatives also focus on improving the value chain by providing technical support to partners (Kazeem, 2017). The future of crowd farming from these two national initiatives will in the midterm see the government realising its dream of seeing an adequately funded agriculture to meet the ever increasing demand of food.

CONCLUSION

Zimbabwe despite being faced with a myriad of challenges in financing commercial agriculture as depicted by the historical experiences can realise its dream of a well-resourced agriculture by borrowing from experiences elsewhere. A closer look at the success stories elsewhere with regards to market orientation and innovation shows that if adopted in Zimbabwe Agriculture finance headway may be done. The land bank should be autonomously run to unlock funding for agriculture, more than twenty years after its inception the government still remains the sole funder with 100% stake, if the success story of the Grameen Bank is something to go by (government shading off its stake from an initial 100% to the present 7% and subsequent increase in loan portfolio to agriculture from a mere less than USD$60 000 to more than USD$800 million loan portfolio to agriculture) the nation stands to benefit. Also innovative collateral substitution models can be adopted by commercial banks, in which banks can engage contractors in advancing loans. This highly innovative model eliminates the need for collateral as contractors absorb some of the risk and can hedge against adverse price movements using hedging techniques. Thus allowing banks to advance loans without the need for collateral. In addition, the government can initiate crowd funding models of the Nigerian type by incentivising companies willing to mobilise resources for agriculture through public platforms to do that without being taxed for some time (tax holidays), thus harnessing resources for agriculture. These companies can lease idle land and subcontracts qualified farmers to do production and be rewarded later. Savings mobilisation through the BRI model of Indonesia can be adopted, where players are given autonomy to attract and retain savings for onward lending to agriculture. All the resources we need as a country we have; to reinforce this we borrow from Kagame (2018) who had this to say:

I would rather argue, that we need to mobilise the right mind set to harness resources we have, rather than more external funding….. After all, in Africa, we have everything we need….”

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