Institutionalizing Governance reforms for curbing corruption in Zimbabwe’s State-Enterprises

Abstract

This study develops a governance-based institutional framework to curb corruption in Zimbabwe's state-owned enterprises (SOEs), where entrenched corruption has eroded service delivery, economic stability, and public trust. Despite numerous legal and institutional reforms, corruption remains pervasive, highlighting the ineffectiveness of current anti-corruption strategies. Drawing on qualitative content analysis of 30 empirical studies published between 2010 and 2025, this research integrates Principal agent theory, Institutional Theory, X-inefficiency Theory, Stakeholder Theory, and Expectancy Theory to diagnose systemic corruption drivers and propose context-specific interventions. Studies were purposively selected based on their focus on corruption in SOEs, governance practices, and reform initiatives in resource-constrained settings. Key findings identify weak regulatory enforcement, political interference, limited funding of oversight institutions, and inadequate stakeholder participation as critical enablers of corruption. The study proposes a multi-theoretical framework combining legal reform, digital governance tools, stakeholder engagement, and performance-based accountability mechanisms. The resulting model offers a practical, theory-based framework reflecting Zimbabwe’s governance realities. It provides actionable strategies to promote transparency and rebuild trust in SOEs, with potential relevance for governance reforms in other developing countries.